



OVERVIEW of the Daf

1) Offering ketores outside of the Beis HaMikdash (cont.)

After refuting Abaye's explanation Rava offers his own explanation of the dispute between Chachamim and R' Elazar.

Rava applies the position of Chachamim to three different circumstances.

R' Ashi defends Abaye's earlier explanation from Rava's challenge.

2) Reduction of non-blood offerings

The Gemara asks whether the reduction of non-blood offerings outside of the Beis HaMikdash is significant.

Two unsuccessful attempts to resolve this matter are presented and the matter is left unresolved.

3) Sacrificial parts attached to the meat

The Gemara inquires why there is liability for offering sacrificial parts attached to the meat outside the Beis HaMikdash when the meat should constitute an interposition.

Three resolutions to this inquiry are recorded.

4) MISHNAH: The Mishnah discusses the halachos of offering a Korban Mincha outside of the Beis HaMikdash.

5) Mixing the kemitzah with the remaining Mincha

The Mishnah's ruling that there is liability for burning outside the Beis HaMikdash the kemitzah together with the remaining Mincha is challenged.

R' Zeira explains the rationale behind the ruling.

6) MISHNAH: The Mishnah presents two disputes related to offering a Mincha outside of the Beis HaMikdash.

7) Burning just the kemitzah

R' Yitzchok inquires about the effect of burning the kemitzah without the levonah.

The Gemara searches for the Tanna for whom this question is relevant.

After pointing to the Tanna of our Mishnah the Gemara leaves the inquiry unresolved.

7) MISHNAH: The halachos related to throwing korban blood, pouring the water libation and spilling out the remaining chattas blood outside of the Beis HaMikdash is discussed.

8) Clarifying R' Elazar's position

Rava asserts that R' Elazar agrees that one is liable for throwing part of the korban blood outside of the Beis HaMikdash.

R' Yochanan in the name of R' Menachem Yodfa'ah asserts that R' Elazar follows R' Akiva's opinion that the source for pouring the water libation is Biblical.

A number of challenges to this assertion are recorded and Reish Lakish concludes that R' Elazar follows the opinion that the source for pouring water libations is Halacha L'Moshe M'Sinai.

A Baraisa presents a dispute between R' Elazar and Chachamim regarding one who pours water outside of the Beis HaMikdash.

R' Nachman bar Yitzchok suggests one explanation of the point of dispute between these two opinions. ■

Distinctive INSIGHT

Placing limbs and the k'zaviv of קמיצה on the fire of the Altar

אמאי והאיכא חציצה, אמר שמואל כשהפכו

The Mishnah rules that a person is liable if he offers a consecrated animal outside of the courtyard, with the meat and the limbs joined together. In general, the meat of an offering should have been eaten by the kohanim or the owners, and the limbs should have been offered on the Altar. The Gemara asks to clarify why the person should be liable, because the meat is not fit for placement on the Altar in the Mikdash. Here, where the meat and the limbs are placed together as an offering outside the courtyard, the meat should serve as an interposition between the limbs and the pyre of wood upon which they are being burned. Rashi notes that the Torah says (Vayikra 1:8) that the sacrificial parts should be placed on the wood that is on the fire, and if the limbs are not in contact with the wood of the fire, this placement would be invalid. Accordingly, one would not be liable for this type of service outside.

Shmuel answers that the halacha in the Mishnah only applies to where the person flipped the meat over so that the limbs were in direct contact with the wood of the fire. It seems that this being the case, there is no longer any novel teaching in the Mishnah, because this case would be obvious. Tosafos answers, though, that the point is that we do not consider this to be an unusual way of roasting the meat, and the person is liable for offering it outside.

Mitzpeh Eisan points out that the Mishnah later on the daf teaches that if the k'mitza is taken from a mincha, and the k'mitza then falls back into the flour that remained (the שייירים), a person would be liable if he were to bring this combination and offer it on an altar outside the courtyard. Here, too, we are faced with the problem that the k'mitza which was originally removed is the part of the mincha which should have been placed on the Altar in the Mikdash, and when it is now brought outside the courtyard it is not in direct contact with the fire, as it is mixed with the flour which remained. And here, in the case of the flour of the mincha, the answer of Shmuel is not applicable. It only applies to a piece of meat with the limbs where the meat can be turned over and the limbs be placed in contact with the fire.

Mitzpeh Eisan answers that the necessity for direct contact with the fire of the altar is only true of limbs. This is where the verse states that it must be "on the wood that is on the fire." However, this stipulation that there be no interposition between the flour and the fire is not stated.

The Gri"z explains that the halacha is that after placing the limbs on the fire, there is an additional need to arrange the limbs

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HALACHAH Highlight

Writing *דיי* on faded, red *דיי*

Like kinds do not interpose

The Gemara mentions the principle *מין במינו אינו חוצץ*—like kinds do not interpose. Later authorities discuss whether this principle refers to two items that have a similar appearance or whether the principle refers to items that also have the same halacha. A Sefer Torah was written correctly but with the passage of time the ink faded and all that remained was red and thus invalid. A scribe came and traced over the red lettering so that the faded letters now appeared black. Rav Shlomo Kluger¹ initially entertained the possibility that the tracing should not render the letters valid since the red ink below is an interposition between the valid black ink and the parchment. He then rejected that approach and ruled that it is valid. Although the black ink is written on red ink since it is ink we may apply the principle of *מין במינו אינו חוצץ*.

Chasam Sofer² disagreed with the application of the principle of *מין במינו אינו חוצץ* to this case. This principle applies only when the lower item is valid for use the same as the upper item but where the lower item is invalid the principle does not apply. Accordingly, although the red ink was originally black, valid ink, once it faded and became invalid it constitutes an interposition. Although Chasam Sofer disagreed with Rav Kluger's reasoning he agreed with his final ruling. The rationale behind Chasam's Sofer's position is that once the ink has faded all that it left is a

מין במינו אינו חוצץ

REVIEW and Remember

1. Under what condition is one liable for offering an invalid korban outside of the Beis HaMikdash?
2. Why is one who offers an olive's volume of a Shelamim and its sacrificial parts outside of the Beis HaMikdash is not liable?
3. What is the point of dispute between Tanna Kamma and R' Elazar?
4. What is the halachic meaning of *מלא חפניו*?

red appearance of the letter and appearances do not contain any substance that could constitute an interposition.

Rav Kluger rejected Chasam Sofer's understanding of this principle and cited many instances in which this principle is cited even when one of the items is invalid. One example is found in our Gemara that states that the meat of the korban and its fat is considered *מין במינו* and as such the meat is not an interposition between the fat and the altar. The meat is unfit for use as a korban and nevertheless, the Gemara applies the principle of *מין במינו אינו חוצץ*. ■

1. שו"ת טוב טעם ודעת קמא סי' רמד-רמ"ה.
2. שו"ת חת"ס יו"ד סי' רנ"ו. ■

STORIES Off the Daf

Separating the Upper and Lower Body

"מין במינו אינו חוצץ..."

People sometimes want to speak in learning or say *divrei kedushah* when they are up to their necks in water, but unless there is a belt or other separation between the heart and the lower body this is forbidden. When a certain man wondered if he was required to wear a belt over his swimming shirt every time he went swimming, he was told that he was not. "Rabbeinu Yonah rules that merely holding your hand against your waist counts like enough of a separation to make a brochah."¹

"But how can the body be a hefsek for itself?" the man pressed. "After all, the halachah is that *min b'mino* is not *chotzetz*?"

In response, he was told that the Hala-

chos Ketanos, ז"ל, proved that this halachah is valid from today's daf. "It is clear from Zevachim 110 that this is permitted. There we find that if one offered *kodoshim* meat with the *eimurim* attached outside the *mikdash*, he is liable. The Gemara wonders why he should be liable since the meat is *chotzetz* between the *eimurim* and the pyre. Rav Yochanan explains that our *mishnah* follows the opinion of Rav Shimon who does not require that the *eimurim* touch the wood. But Rav explains that since the *eimurim* are also meat, they are *min b'mino* with the meat and it is not *chotzetz*.

"Since the halachah follows Rav Yochanan when he argues with Rav, presumably he is correct here. Since he does not use Rav's simple answer, we see that he holds that *min b'mino* can be *chotzetz* at times."²

From this reply another question arose. "But we hold that a person's hand is

not enough of a covering to enable a person without a *yarmulke* to cover his own exposed head. Why don't we say that one's own body is a *hefsek* in that case just as we do here?"

The answer he received was very satisfying. "It all depends on what is a usual action. Since it is normal for one to cover his head with his hand even if he does not intend to cover his head as a religious duty, this is not enough of a covering. But regarding creating a *hefsek* between his heart and his lower self, this is not a usual action and is therefore a *bona fide hefsek*."³ ■

1. בית יוסף, סי' ע"ד
2. שו"ת הלכות קטנות, ח"ב, סי' קכ"א
3. הסכמת האחרונים, מובא במ"ב, סי' ע"ד, סי"ק י"ד

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on the wood (based upon Yoma 24b, and Rambam, Hil. Ma'asei HaKorbanos 6:4). This halacha does not apply to a *mincha*. ■