



OVERVIEW of the Daf

1) **MISHNAH (Cont.):** The Mishnah continues to list certain things that will not disqualify a korban.

2) Clarifying R' Yehudah's position

R' Elazar offers an explanation for R' Yehudah's position in the Mishnah.

This explanation is successfully challenged.

An alternative explanation for R' Yehudah is suggested.

This explanation is unsuccessfully challenged.

The Gemara explains why R' Yehudah agrees in the latter cases of the Mishnah that the korban does not become invalidated.

A discussion is recorded why R' Yehudah does not disagree with two of the cases mentioned in the Mishnah.

3) Slaughtering a Chatas in the southern part of the *azarah*

The Gemara questions an earlier assertion that according to R' Yehudah one who slaughters a Chatas in the southern part of the *azarah* receives lashes.

The Gemara answers that there is a disagreement regarding R' Yehudah's position about this matter.

4) Clarifying R' Yehudah's position (cont.)

R' Abba asserts that according to R' Yehudah one could render a korban piggul if he has piggul intent even after invalidating the korban through the intent to leave over the blood or sacrificial parts until the next day.

Rava suggests proof to this assertion but it is rejected.

R' Huna successfully refutes R' Abba's position.

5) Korban liabilities

R' Chisda in the name of Ravina bar Sila asserts that intention that a korban should be eaten the next day by people who are *tmei'im* renders a korban piggul.

Rava suggests a proof to this ruling but it is rejected.

R' Chisda rules that a *tamei* person who eats a Pesach that was not roasted or Todah loaves from which no separation was made is liable.

Rava suggests a proof to this ruling but it is rejected.

הדרן עלך כל הפסולין

6) **MISHNAH:** The Mishnah begins with a disagreement between Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel regarding the minimal number of blood applications necessary for a korban to be valid. The Mishnah proceeds to discuss the effect of different improper intents while throwing the blood. In contrast to those korbanos that are offered on the outer altar those that are offered on the inner altar necessitate all of the blood applications.

7) A single blood application

A Baraisa cites the source that a single blood application on the outer altar is sufficient. ■

Distinctive INSIGHT

The intent to bring the blood to the wrong place

קסבר רבי יהודה בעינין מקום שיהא משולש בדם בבשר ובאימורין

Every offering has constraints regarding where it may be brought. There are restrictions where the offering may be slaughtered, where its blood and meat may be taken, and those which are edible can only be eaten in certain places. For example, the meat of a *shelamim* may only be eaten in the courtyard or throughout the city of Yerushalayim. It may not be brought into the *heichal*, and it may not be taken outside of Yerushalayim. Any thought of removing it from its boundaries can disqualify it. R' Yehuda holds improper intent for an offering to be brought outside of its proper place only applies where the thought is to bring the offering outside of Yerushalayim, but not where the intent is to bring it within its boundaries, into the *heichal*. Rashi explains that R' Yehuda learns this from the phrase in the verse of disqualifications of offerings which states, "ביום השלישי—on the third day." The extra word "שלישי" refers to a place which can possibly contain blood, meat and limbs. At the time when private altars were permitted, it was allowed to bring an offering outside Yerushalayim, and the blood, meat and limbs of animals could have been brought there. Now, with the service of the *Beis HaMikdash*, it is no longer allowed to intend to bring the blood of an offering outside Yerushalayim. This halacha, however, does not include having intent to bring into the *heichal*. Although actually bringing the blood into the *heichal* is a violation of the boundaries of the offering, the improper intent does not include this, as this area was never eligible for the service of burning the limbs or eating meat.

Tosafos (29a, ד"ה למקום) explains that Rashi's words regarding eating meat not taking place in the *heichal* are

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REVIEW and Remember

1. What is derived from the phrase *לא יניח ממנו עד בקר*?
2. Explain *אין דם מבטל דם*.
3. According to Rava, at what point in the process of bringing a korban can improper intent render it piggul?
4. What is the point of dispute between Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel?

HALACHAH Highlight

Intent is equivalent to action

ועוד טעמא דר' יהודה סברא הוא

Furthermore, the rationale behind R' Yehudah's opinion is logic

Rashi¹ explains that the disqualification of intending to take a korban out of its designated area or to leave it for the next day is rooted in logic rather than an exposition. Since a korban is invalidated if one takes the korban outside of its designated place or leaves it for the next day, so too, intent for these actions disqualify a korban. This principle is known as **מחשבה כמעשה** – intent for the action is the same as the action. Sefas Emes² questions the rationale behind this ruling. Why should we consider intent to be equivalent to action? He suggests that the primary rationale behind R' Yehudah's position is the verse that states **כל דבר רע** – anything that is bad. R' Yehudah's addition to this is that, logically, intent to take the korban outside of its designated place or to leave it for the next day is also categorized as **רע** – bad. Nesivos Hakodesh³ suggests that the source for the principle that intent invalidates as does an action is from the halacha of piggul where we find that intent to consume a korban outside of its proper time or place disqualifies a korban the same as if the korban was actually consumed outside of the proper time or place. The rationale behind Rabanan's dissenting position is that piggul is a novel principle that is limited to cases involving consumption, but not cases where the intent is to take the blood or sacrificial parts outside of the proper place or to leave them for the next day.

Teshuvos Achiezer⁴ explains the rationale behind the principle that intent for the action is the same as the action. It does

(Insight...continued from page 1)

somewhat imprecise. We find (later, 63a) that if idolater enemies circle the entire courtyard, kohanim are allowed to retreat to the heichal and to eat the meat of the offerings (קדשי קדשים) there.

Tosafos presents and discusses alternative explanations to define the term "משולש".

It can refer to the outer altar, as opposed to the inner altar. The outside altar is where blood, meat and limbs of the offerings were brought, as opposed to the inside altar, where only blood may be placed.

Some explain that the intent to bring the offering outside its domain is only an issue where the one who expresses this intent is standing in the courtyard itself, and not where he stands outside the courtyard and slaughters the animal with a long knife.

Tosafos cites Rabeinu Yom Tov who says that the intent itself is an issue only where it is to splash the blood in a place which disqualifies for all the parts of the offering, the blood, the meat and the limbs. This refers to outside Yerushalayim, as within the city the meat can be eaten for most offerings. ■

not mean that intent is considered as though the action itself was performed, since the action was not, in fact, performed. The meaning of the principle is that intent to take the blood out of the designated area or to leave the blood until the next day disqualifies the korban simply because of the incorrect intent. ■

1. רש"י ד"ה ועוד.
2. שפת אמת לסוגיין ד"ה סברא.
3. נתיבות הקודש ד"ה אלא.
4. שו"ת אחיעזר ח"ב סי' כ"ט אות ב'.

STORIES Off the Daf

The Wild Bird

"לחמי תודה..."

The Alter of Kelm, zt"l, gives an inspiring explanation of a famous parable of our sages. "The wise men and philosophers of the nations had a very deep understanding of the strengths of the human psyche. Nevertheless, there is a vast difference between our understanding and the way they see things. One reason for this is that they do not understand the strength of the drive towards negative behavior within every person.

"This is the meaning of the parable of our sages: 'This is like a person who gave a

צפור דרור, a wild bird, to his servant to guard. He said, "Although you will be rewarded if we are vigilant to watch it, you must guard it with your very life, since lack of vigilance will cost you your life." "

"A wild bird requires only an instant's lack of vigilance to slip out of one's hands. So too, we each have a propensity to do evil which springs out the moment one lets down his guard. Once evil takes hold of him, he can never know to what lows he will be brought. But we also see from here the power of every mitzvah, since the same is true in the inverse. Once one accustoms himself to good he can never know to what heights this will take him. We must always be vigilant to guard ourselves from sin, while continuing to

strengthen ourselves to do whatever good we can."¹

The Sifsei Tzaddik, zt"l, gives a similar explanation regarding the lachmei todah brought on today's daf. "The reason why there are specifically forty challos of lachmei todah is to allude to the forty days of gestation of every human embryo, since this sacrifice teaches that every person has hope. We bring challos from chametz too, since we must internalize that no man is only good. As the verse states, 'There is no righteous man who always does good and never sins.' Therefore, although most of the lachamim are matzah, there is also chametz. We must be mostly good, and minimize the evil."² ■

1. מובא בבית קלם, מידות ע"י ע"ר, ורע"א
2. שפתי צדיק, אמור, אות כ"ה

