



OVERVIEW of the Daf

1) Pesach offered with improper intent (cont.)

The Gemara presents two explanations how we know that a Pesach offered the rest of the year can only become a Shelamim rather than a different variety of korban.

The Gemara explains why a Pesach cannot become a Maaser, a Bechor, a Temurah or a Todah.

The explanation related to the Todah is challenged and subsequently revised.

The assumption that the term **מִן הַצֶּאֱן** refers to the Pesach is unsuccessfully challenged.

R' Chana of Baghdad also unsuccessfully challenges the assumption that the phrase **מִן הַצֶּאֱן** refers to the Pesach.

2) Residual Pesach

It is noted that there are multiple sources that a residual Pesach is treated as a Shelamim.

The reason three sources are needed for this principle is explained.

3) Chatas

Rav in the name of Mavog rules that if a Chatas is slaughtered for the sake of the Chatas of Nachshon it is valid.

This ruling is challenged and a revised version of the teaching is presented.

This explanation is further clarified.

Another challenge forces a final revision.

A second version of this ruling is presented.

Rav rules on the status of a Chatas slaughtered with various intents.

Rava inquires about the status of a Chatas slaughtered for a Variable Chatas for tum'ah violations.

The Gemara relates that R' Acha the son of Rava ruled

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REVIEW and Remember

1. How do we know that a Pesach cannot become a Todah?

2. How do we know that the tail of a goat is not offered?

3. What is the Chatas Nachshon?

4. What is the point of dispute between Rav and R' Acha the son of Rava?

Distinctive INSIGHT

Change of intent from one chattas category to another

בעי רבא חטאת חלב ששחטה על מי שמחוייב חטאת דטומאת מקדש וקדשיו

There are various reasons why a chattas offering might be brought. The Gemara analyzes what the halacha would be if a chattas is slaughtered for a different category of chattas than the one actually being brought. Rav teaches that if a chattas was supposed to be offered for someone who sinned by eating cheilev, but the chattas was slaughtered intending it to be for the sin of eating blood or worship of idolatry, the chattas is valid. This is not considered to be a “change in designation,” because all these sins are for kareis (if done on purpose) sins. However, if the chattas was mistakenly offered for the sake of a chattas of a nazir or metzora, the offering is not valid. These particular chattas offerings are not for sin, and they have the status of an olah. When a chattas which is for sin is slaughtered for the sake of these “olah” offerings, it is a change in status which disqualifies the sin-chattas.

Rava inquires what the halacha is when a chattas designated for the sin of eating cheilev was slaughtered for the sake of the sin of entering the Beis HaMikdash while tamei. On the one hand, both sins are deserving of kareis for one who violates them on purpose. Yet, if the violation is done inadvertently, the sin of eating cheilev is a set chattas, whereas the offering for entering the Beis HaMikdash while tamei is an oleh v'yoreid—it varies based upon the financial abilities of the sinner. In this regard, they do not share the same atonement and the change in intention would not allow the offering to be valid. Rava leaves his inquiry unresolved.

Rambam (Hilchos P'sulei HaMukdashim 15:7) writes that any chattas that is brought for a person for any variation of chattas other than the one prescribed is invalid. Rambam does not entertain the possibility which Rava suggests as being acceptable. Kesef Mishnah explains that because the Gemara does not arrive at a final conclusion, Rambam rules strictly that the offering cannot be valid. Rabbi Akiva Eiger questions this ruling of Rambam. The only reason the Gemara considers the chattas to be invalid is that the chattas for eating blood is a set chattas as opposed to the chattas for impurity in the Mikdash. This means that if the chattas was supposed to be for impurity of the Mikdash, and the offering was brought for denial of testimony (שמיעת קול), where both variations of chattas share the same atonement, the offering should be valid. Yet, Rambam rules that any variation of intent from one chattas to another is not valid. ■

HALACHAH Highlight

Spelling errors in a Sefer Torah

”כשב” לרבות את הפסח לאליה

”Lamb” includes the requirement to offer the tail of the Korban Pesach

Shelah¹ expresses astonishment at Poskim who rule that the requirement to take out another Sefer Torah if an error is found in a Sefer Torah is limited to where the mistake creates a change in the meaning of the words but if the mistake does not effect a change in the meaning of the words it is unnecessary to take out another Sefer Torah. Shelah writes that he does not know where such an impression came from since even one letter missing from a Sefer Torah invalidates the Sefer Torah. That which Rema² rules that it is unnecessary to take out another Sefer Torah for extra or missing letters refers to where the extra or missing letter does not change the reading of the word but if the extra or missing letter changes the reading of the word all opinions would agree that the Sefer Torah must be replaced. Therefore, if the word כשב was written in place of כבש or vice versa the Sefer Torah must be replaced.

Teshuvos Haravaz³ was asked whether it is necessary to take out another Sefer Torah if the word כבש is written in place of the word כשב. He answered that according to the letter of the law another Sefer Torah should be taken out in accordance with Shelah and others. However, the justifica-

stringently on all the cases mentioned by Rav.

R' Acha explains, according to his understanding, what was the intent of Rava's inquiry and the matter is left unresolved.

4) Intent from one service to another

R' Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree about the status of a korban that was slaughtered without specific intent regarding the throwing of the blood.

The respective rationales are explained. ■

tion of the practice of not replacing a Sefer Torah with such an error is that the meaning of the word does not change as a result. Pischei Teshuvah⁴ also quotes authorities who maintain that it is not the pronunciation of the word that is important but the meaning that is conveyed by what is read and as long as the intent and meaning does not change it is not necessary to replace the Sefer Torah that contains the error.

One proof cited by Teshuvos Haravaz is our Gemara that uses the word כבש to teach that there is a requirement to offer the tail of the Pesach. In Pesachim (96b), however, the same conclusion comes from the Gemara's exposition of the word כשב. This indicates that there is no substantial difference between the words, therefore if mistakenly one of these terms is used in place of the other the Sefer Torah is not pasul. ■

1. שלייה מסכת שבת פרק נר מצוה ס"י"ח.
2. רמ"א או"ח סי' קמ"ג סעי' ד'.
3. שו"ת הרב"ז יו"ד סי' ק"י.
4. פת"ש יו"ד סי' רע"ט סק"ד. ■

STORIES Off the Daf

Actions and Intentions

”מעשיה מוכיחין...”

On today's daf we find that Rabbi Shimon holds that certain actions show what one's intentions must have been. This concept has broad applications in everyday life, especially in our times, since some people have a difficult time focusing on the mitzvah at hand when their minds are preoccupied. Are our actions enough to show what we truly intended, even though when we did them we were distracted? The Chayei Adam, zt"l, rules that we can.

“One who eats matzah, shakes a lulav, or says Shema every day on time

within the regular order of prayers has discharged his obligation even though he did not think about discharging his obligation with these actions, since he is clearly doing so to fulfill his obligation. If it is clear from his actions that he could only be doing this to fulfill the mitzvah, his action was effective despite his lack of focus.”

A certain man wondered whether this applied to one who said Shema completely by rote. If he was so completely wrapped up in his own thoughts that he hardly knew what he was doing, had he discharged his obligation? On the one hand, it is clear from his actions that he meant to discharge his obligation. Yet why is this better than acting in his sleep? How is one who recited by rote better than one who dreamed that he

recited Shema and actually did so while still sleeping? Perhaps a person davening completely by rote must also repeat Shema.

When this question was brought before Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, zt"l, he was understandably taken aback. “Presumably, one who is so completely detached from his davening that he doesn't even notice his lips moving does not discharge his obligation, since this is literally like davening while asleep which is certainly invalid. Nevertheless, the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch that one who is unsure if he is up to the first or second **וכתבתם** of Shema must go back to the first unless he also recited **למען ירבו** by rote suggests that such a davening is valid **בדיעבד**.”¹ ■

1. שו"ת מנחת שלמה, ח"א, א'