

## OVERVIEW of the Daf

### 1) Fulfilling the mitzvah of lulav on Shabbos (cont.)

Rabbah's explanation as to why the mitzvah of lulav is not performed on Shabbos is successfully challenged because, according to Rabbah's explanation there is no reason to distinguish the first day from the other days of Sukkos.

The reason we distinguish between the first day and the other days is that taking the lulav on the first day is a Biblical commandment as opposed to the other days.

A resolution to two contradictory Baraisos supports the Gemara's assertion that the mitzvah of lulav is performed on the first day of Yom Tov in Eretz Yisroel even nowadays.

### 2) The mitzvah of taking the lulav on the first day

A Baraisa is cited that identifies the source that teaches that there is a Biblical commandment to take a lulav in the provinces on the first day of Sukkos.

The Gemara clarifies the necessity for the cited Baraisa to teach that, Biblically, the mitzvah of lulav is performed even on Shabbos.

In the course of the above discussion, the Gemara mentioned that the mitzvah of sukkah applies during the day and the night. The source for this assertion is identified.

### 3) The mitzvah of ערבה

R' Yochanan asserts that the mitzvah of aravah overrides Shabbos when it coincides with the seventh day of Sukkos, in order to publicize the mitzvah.

R' Yochanan's assertion is unsuccessfully challenged.

Different resolutions are presented to explain why the mitzvah of aravah does not override Shabbos even nowadays.

R' Yosef explained that the reason is that the mitzvah of aravah is to stand the branch next to the Altar, and without the Altar there is no mitzvah.

Abaye successfully challenges this explanation on his third attempt and demonstrates that the mitzvah is performed by taking the aravah by hand.

The Gemara momentarily digresses to cite a dispute whether they circled the Altar with the lulav or the aravah.

Once it has been demonstrated that the mitzvah is to take the aravah by hand the earlier question returns, namely, why doesn't the mitzvah of aravah override Shabbos in Eretz Yisroel nowadays.

The Gemara answers that since the mitzvah does not override Shabbos in Bavel it will not override Shabbos in Eretz Yisroel either.

This assertion is challenged from the earlier ruling that lulav overrides Shabbos in Eretz Yisroel but not in Bavel. ■

## Distinctive INSIGHT

*The cases in which the rule of Rabbah applies*

והיינו טעמא דשופר והיינו טעמא דמגילה

There are three classic cases where Rabbah rules that a particular mitzvah must be postponed or cancelled due to the concern that the mitzvah implement might be inadvertently carried on Shabbos. They are the taking a lulav on the first day of Sukkos, blowing shofar on the first day of Rosh HaShanah (Rosh HaShanah 29a), and reading of Megillas Esther (Megillah 4b). In each case, the Gemara mentions that Rabbah made his ruling not only in the case being discussed, but in the other two cases, as well.

The צ"ח notes that there is another case, however, in which Rabbah ruled that the concern about carrying on Shabbos pre-empts a halachah. A person who has contracted tum'ah of a corpse has to undergo a seven-day process of purification, during which he is sprinkled on the third and seventh day with waters from the Parah Adumah. Rabbah rules (Pesachim 69a) that if the third or seventh day occurs on Shabbos, this sprinkling is postponed, due to the possibility that a person will carry the water through the public domain. Why is this halachah not mentioned together with the other classic cases of shofar, lulav and megillah?

ר"ן in Megillah explains that we do not suspend all mitzvos on Shabbos due to the possibility that one might carry. For example, bris milah is allowed on Shabbos, and we do not worry that the tools necessary might be carried in the street. The reason we do not prohibit bris milah is that the only one who is preoccupied with the mitzvah is the mohel, and we trust that others who are not distracted will remind him not to carry. Shofar, lulav and megillah are obligations upon everyone, and we therefore worry that some individual might forget and carry the mitzvah object in order to do his mitzvah. When someone needs the Parah Adumah waters for his purifying process in order to bring the Korban Pesach, although he is the only one who is so busy, we cannot rely upon others to remind him, because they are also busy with their Pesach offerings (on Shabbos). On all other Shabbosos of the year, we do not allow sprinkling due to a different reason, and that is the problem of מתקן—*גברא*—we disallow the purification process due to its appearing as if the person is becoming fixed or perfected, which is similar to the violation of Shabbos of *מכה בפטיש*. On erev Pesach, the aspect of מתקן *גברא* would be dismissed, due to the need to offer the פסח.

The Gemara generally omits listing the rule of Rabbah prohibiting sprinkling on Shabbos, because his reason only applies to erev Pesach, and not to Shabbos all year long. ■

# HALACHAH Highlight

## The parameters of the Rabbinic Decree

אמר רבה גזרה שמא יטלנו בידו וילך אצל בקי ללמוד ויעבירו ד' אמות ברשות הרבים והיינו טעמא דשופר והיינו טעמא דמגילה  
*Rabbah explained it is a decree lest one take it [the lulav] in their hand and walk to an expert to learn [to perform the mitzvah properly] and they will carry it four amos in a public domain. This is also the reason for [not blowing] shofar [on Shabbos] as well as the reason for [the prohibition against reading] Megillah [on Shabbos.]*

The Poskim question the parameters of the Rabbinic decree. If someone, in violation of the Rabbinic decree, takes a lulav or blows the shofar on Shabbos do they fulfill the mitzvah? Do the sages have the authority to uproot, entirely a Biblical commandment to the point where one does not receive credit for fulfilling the mitzvah, or perhaps that is beyond their authority? One practical aspect of this question is whether the brachos recited when performing the mitzvah on Shabbos are valid. If Chazal have the authority to uproot the mitzvah entirely, the brachos recited on Shabbos are considered to have been recited in vain and shehecheyanu would need to be repeated on the second day. On the other hand, if Chazal do not have the authority to uproot the mitzvah entirely, the mitzvah was fulfilled when performed on Shabbos, albeit in violation of the Rabbinic decree, and there is no need to repeat shehecheyanu

Avnei Nezer<sup>1</sup> writes that the authority of Chazal towards

# REVIEW and Remember

1. Why is it necessary for the Baraisa to teach that taking the lulav on the first day overrides Shabbos?
2. What is the source that the mitzvah of sukkah applies during the night and day?
3. Why does Rabbah's decree not apply to the mitzvah of ערבה?
4. What is the mitzvah of ערבה?

Biblical commandments is that they can decree that the mitzvah not be fulfilled (שב ועל תעשה) but they may not uproot the mitzvah entirely. Others<sup>2</sup>, however, cite the Gemara<sup>3</sup> earlier that discusses a person who sits with his head and a majority of his body in the sukkah but the table is in the house. The sages, in that case, asserted that one who sits in the sukkah under such conditions has never fulfilled the mitzvah of sukkah. Thus, we see that a Rabbinic decree can uproot a mitzvah. The majority of Poskim<sup>4</sup> rule that in cases of doubt one should be cautious and not repeat the brachah. ■

1. שו"ת אבני נזר אה"ע סי' קי"ט אות ע' יור"ד סי' קמ"א אות י"א וי"ב
2. פמ"ג פתיחה כוללת להל' ק"ש
3. גמ' לעיל ג. וע' תוס' שם ד"ה דאמר
4. ראה אבנ"ז הנ"ל דבר אברהם ח"ב סי' כ"ו אות י' שו"ת מהרש"ג אר"ח סי' ל"ו ועוד ואכמ"ל ■

# STORIES Off the Daf

## The beating of the Aravos

שאינן בייחוסין מודים שחיבוט ערבה דוחה את השבת

On today's daf, we find a discussion about the חיבוט, the beating, of the aravos. Rav Yehudah d'Modena, zt"l, explains that since the arava represents a Jew who is devoid of Torah and mitzvos, the beating it gets signifies that suffering in this world purifies even such a person and makes him worthy of eternal reward.

A young boy from London afflicted with cancer was taken to the States for treatment where the doctors said that if they go through with their plan, the boy could live a few more weeks. But would he be willing to go through terrible pain just to buy a few more weeks of life? The treatment alone would incapacitate him. At most, he would be able to daven for a few moments a day.

After hearing how difficult the course of treatment would be, the boy decided to refuse further medical intervention. Rabbi Ezriel Tauber, shlit"א, was called in to speak with him, and after their conversation the boy's attitude changed completely.

He told his doctors, "I've decided that I do want the treatment along with all of the suffering that it will bring."

What had Rabbi Tauber told this young boy? "If you live another second believing in Hashem even without pain, it's worth absolutely everything. But with your pain, the reward that is yours cannot be measured at all."

The boy lived a few more weeks, and his family testified later that until the very end he exhibited such willing acceptance of his suffering, even joy in it, because he could feel that every instant of pain sanctified by belief in Hashem made such a difference. ■

