

This month's Daf Digest is dedicated in memory of
 Rivka Yenta bas Asher Anshel & Yosef ben Chaim haCohen Weiss on 8 and 14th of Elul
 By Mr. and Mrs. Manny Weiss

OVERVIEW of the Daf

1) "And I" (cont.)

A Baraisa is cited that supports Reish Lakish's assertion that the declaration "And I" will work only when it is made within the time it takes a student to greet his rebbi - תוך כדי דבור.

Another unsuccessful attempt is made to support Reish Lakish's position.

The Gemara inquires whether a person who declares, "And I" intends to latch on to his predecessor or to the one who made the original declaration.

The practical difference between these two approaches is presented.

Three unsuccessful attempts are made to resolve this inquiry.

On the fourth attempt the Gemara demonstrates that a person latches on to the declaration of his predecessor.

2) "My mouth is like his mouth etc"

The Mishnah's ruling related to the declaration, "My mouth is like his mouth, etc." is challenged from a Baraisa.

R' Yehudah resolves the inquiry.

3) A husband's revocation of his wife's vow

The Gemara inquires whether a husband's revocation of his wife's vow uproots it retroactively or whether it cuts it off from this moment forward.

The practical difference between these two approaches is presented.

Three attempts are made to resolve this inquiry. ■

REVIEW and Remember

1. What is the difference whether a person latches onto his predecessor or the first declaration?

2. According to the Gemara's conclusion, does a person latch onto his predecessor or does he latch on to the first declaration?

3. What is the difference whether the husband uproots his wife's vow retroactively or whether he cuts it off from this moment forward?

4. If a woman set aside animals for her Korban Nezirus and her husband then revoked her vow, what is done with the animals?

Distinctive INSIGHT

Rambam's understanding of Rabbi Yehuda and Tanna Kamma
 לעולם אימא לך בעל מיעקר עקר ומשום דקתני סיפא היפר לה בעלה והיא לא ידעה והיתה שותה יין...אינה סופגת את הארבעים

The Gemara inquires whether the husband's nullification of his wife's nezirus has the effect of canceling the nezirus from its inception (מיעקר עקר), or whether it stops the nezirus from this point and onwards, but the nezirus was valid until that moment. The Mishnah from 23a is cited, where we find the case where a woman declared herself to be a nezirah and then proceeded to drink wine and subject herself to tumah. The Gemara understands that even if her husband nullifies the vow, she is liable for מלקות. This indicates that the power of the husband is to cancel the vow from that moment and beyond (מינו גיזי), thus leaving the woman liable for having violated the nezirus until that point. The Gemara rejects this proof, as it cites the end of that Mishnah where we find that if the woman drinks wine without realizing that her husband nullified the vow, she is nevertheless exempt from lashes. This indicates that the husband's power is to remove the vow from its inception. We can therefore say that the Mishnah is dealing in a case where the husband never did nullify the nezirus, and there is no חידוש in the first case of the Mishnah other than for it to serve as an introduction to the latter case. In the latter case, the woman drank wine without knowing that her husband nullified the vow. Rabbi Yehuda holds that administrative lashes should be given to the woman who, in her own mind, acted in violation of the nezirus that she believed was in effect, and Rabbanan disagree.

Rambam writes (Hilchos Nedarim 12:18): "If a woman did not realize that her husband nullified her nezirus and she drank wine, she is exempt, because the nezirus has been cancelled. Nevertheless, she receives administrative lashes, because she intended to sin." Kesef Mishneh explains that Rambam learns that Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbanan do not argue, and that Rabbi Yehuda's view is an explanation of Tanna Kamma. קרן אורה points out that Rambam came to his conclusion based upon the question of Tosafos, who notes that the illustration of the case is where the woman drank wine *after* the husband nullified the vow. If the point of the Mishnah was simply that the woman acted in a manner she thought was in violation of her nezirus, it could have been presented in a situation where she drank before the nullification. The main thing is that the husband eventually cancelled the vow. However, the Mishnah is teaching the point that even though the woman acted after the vow was already nullified, she still deserves מלקות מרדות, and this is something to which all opinions agree. ■

HALACHAH Highlight

Discharging the obligation to recite a beracha by listening to someone who spoke between the beracha and eating

ר' שמעון אומר אם אמרה לה הריני כמותך שתייהן מותרות

R' Shimon says: If a woman declares, "I am like you," [and the husband of the first woman revokes her vow] both are permitted.

Poskim debate the halacha of a case where someone was making a beracha on behalf of himself and another and he interrupted between the beracha and eating. The one making the beracha is certainly required to make another beracha but the question is whether the listener also loses the beracha. Do we say that since he is dependant upon the one making the beracha and the one making the beracha did not discharge his obligation the listener also does not discharge his obligation, or perhaps once he answered **אמן** he is no longer connected to the one who made the beracha?

Pri Megadim¹ maintains that the listeners have discharged their obligation since they did not interrupt between the beracha and eating. Rav Chaim Falaghi² rejects Pri Megadim's proof and maintains that if the one making the beracha does not discharge his obligation the listeners also do not discharge their obligation. One of the proofs he presents to support his position is our Gemara. In the Gemara's discussion of wheth-

er the husband's revocation uproots his wife's vow retroactively or only cuts it off from that moment forward the Gemara cites a Baraisa that presents a dispute between Tanna Kamma and R' Shimon regarding a woman who latched onto another woman's vow of nezirus. Tosafos explains that all opinions agree that when it is clear that the second woman wanted to behave exactly like the first, whether for leniency or whether for stringency, the second woman's nezirus will also cease if the husband of the first woman revokes her vow. This teaches the principle that when one person relies on another for their status they follow their status for all outcomes. Therefore, when one person is dependent upon another to discharge his obligation to recite a beracha he is completely bound up with the circumstance of the one making the beracha. If turns out that the first person did not discharge his obligation the second person will also not discharge his obligation.

After further analysis Rav Chaim Falaghi rules that the listener should hear the beracha a second time from the one who originally recited the beracha since that person is certainly required to repeat the beracha. Mishnah Berurah³ writes that the implication of the Poskim is that the listener does not fulfill his obligation if the one making the beracha spoke before eating but he leaves the matter unresolved. ■

1. פמ"ג או"ח סי' קס"ז מ"ז סק"ח.

2. חקקי לב ח"א סי' ח'.

3. מ"ב או"ח סי' קס"ז ס"ק מ"ג. ■

STORIES Off the Daf

Brevity—the Soul of Wisdom

"תנא כי רוכלא..."

On today's daf we find the rhetorical question; "Is the Tanna like a peddler?" A peddler brandishes all of his wares. In contrast, the Tanna is usually concise, sometimes cryptic. Brevity is one of the forty-eight means that we learn in the Baraisa of Kinyan Torah (Avos 6:6) through which the Torah is acquired. Conciseness has always been the way of true Chachamim.

Once, Rav Yechezkel Abramsky, zt"l, learned that a convention of prominent Jewish academics was set to be held in London and decided that he, too, would like to attend. When he arrived, he requested permission to speak in front of the group of respected personages. His request was granted. On the dais, Rav

Abramsky spoke with great feeling regarding the paramount importance of strengthening Torah, and quoted liberally from the Shulchan Aruch to prove his point.

One of the most prestigious academics raised a very simple but controversial objection. "But Rabbi, all genuine scholars know that the Shulchan Aruch is outdated. So what you are saying is meaningless."

At this outburst of audacity, a number of participants followed suit and voiced their objections to the Rav. Each person voiced his "proofs" and it appeared as though, instead of a Kiddush Hashem, the opposite would be the result of the Rav's speech.

To everyone's surprise, their objections didn't faze Rav Abramsky in the slightest. Instead, he made a simple request. "Please have a pen and paper ready."

Everyone wondered what this was all

about. The Rav didn't leave them in suspense for long. "You are all basing your views on your superior understanding, so you surely won't object to a little test of your acumen. I am going to tell you a true story. Please summarize it in the most concise fashion that you can." He started to relate a very complicated case replete with numerous details. When he finally finished, it was clear that even the best summary was rather long.

Then the Rav opened a book and read the most concise and clearly superior summary to the incredulous professors. Rav Abramsky then turned to the professor who had been first to object. "The advantage of brevity is known to all. See how this work managed to include every single detail and complexity without wasting a single word. Your summaries were cumbersome compared with the eloquence of the Shulchan Aruch in Choshen Mishpat—the 'outdated' work whose wisdom clearly exceeds your own!" ■