

OVERVIEW of the Daf

1) Allowing the remnants to leaven (cont.)

Ravina successfully challenges the assertion that the term אורתו is needed to teach that Nachshon's korban did not have to be slaughtered in the north.

It is suggested that the term אורתו teaches that the slaughterer does not have to stand to the north.

This suggestion is rejected.

It is suggested that the term אורתו is necessary to teach that birds are not slaughtered to the north.

This explanation is also rejected.

Another suggestion is that the term is used to teach that the Pesach does not have to be slaughtered to the north.

This explanation is also rejected. The Gemara then returns to the first explanation and responds to the challenge to that explanation.

This teaching is unsuccessfully challenged.

2) A Mincha that leavens

R' Pappa teaches that one who bakes a mincha that became leavened receives two sets of lashes.

This ruling is unsuccessfully challenged.

3) Inflicting a blemish on a first-born animal

A Baraisa presents four opinions related to inflicting a blemish on a blemished animal.

R' Chiya bar Abba in the name of R' Yochanan gives two cases to which all opinions agree and then explains the point of dispute in this particular case.

The exchange between two of the opinions regarding their respective expositions is recorded.

4) Causing a Mincha to leaven

R' Ami rules that one who puts yeast on mincha dough causing it to leaven is liable, similar to the liability one would bear in a parallel case involving Shabbos. ■

REVIEW and Remember

1. What is the source that the slaughterer is not required to stand in the north?

2. How do we treat a first-born animal that has a congestion of blood?

3. What is the basis of the prohibition of מחמץ אחר מחמץ?

4. What is derived from the phrase כל מום לא יהיה בו?

Distinctive INSIGHT

Causing a blemish to a consecrated animal in our days

לא נחלקו אלא במטיל מום בבעל מום, רבי מאיר סבר וכו' ורבנן סברי וכו'

A Baraisa is cited where we find a disagreement regarding causing a wound as a medicinal procedure to a bechor, a firstborn male animal, which is stricken with an illness.

In Avoda Zara (13b), we find that if a person consecrates an animal for an offering in our days when we do not bring offerings, the animal should be locked up in a room and left to die.

The Gemara asks why we must let the animal die an extended death, and that we should simply kill the animal and let it die quickly. The particular method of killing the animal is suggested to be גיסתרא, which Rashi explains is to cut the animal in two. This is not a disgrace for a consecrated animal, and this would not lead to anyone mistakenly eating from it, as this is not how an animal is cut when it is slaughtered properly. Rava answers that slicing the animal would appear as if one is causing a blemish to a consecrated animal. The Gemara responds with surprise that this does not just appear as one is blemishing a consecrated animal, it is causing an outright mortal wound! The Gemara explains that causing an injury to a consecrated animal is only prohibited when the Beis HaMikdash is here, and the animal may be brought as an offering. When the Beis HaMikdash is in a state of destruction, this prohibition is not in effect.

The Gemara then inquires about a consecrated animal which has a blemish during the time of the Beis HaMikdash. Such an animal may not be brought as an offering, yet, there remains a prohibition against further injuring the animal. According to the rule of the Gemara, once the animal is not eligible to be brought as an offering this prohibition should be suspended. The Gemara clarifies that, nevertheless, when the Beis HaMikdash is intact, although an animal with a blemish may not be brought as an offering, it does have sacred worth in terms of its monetary value. It can be redeemed and a different, unblemished animal can be bought in its place. When

(Continued on page 2)

Today's Daf Digest is dedicated
By Rabbi and Mrs. Michael Balinsky

In memory of their father
ר' לוי שמחה בן ר' משה, ע"ה

Today's Daf Digest is dedicated
In memory of Davood Sasson ben Itzchak, Miriam bat Eliyahu
and in memory of Rabbi Itzchak Kirzner
on their yahrzeit which is 26th of Tishrei

HALACHAH Highlight

Erasing a letter of Hashem's name that has already been partially erased

במסרס אחר מסרס שהוא חייב

One who castrates an animal after it was castrated, is liable

The Gemara discussed a number of examples of prohibitions that one violates even after the prohibition was initially violated. For example, one who castrates an animal after it was already castrated violates a prohibition. Minchas Chinuch¹ questioned whether this principle is applied to other prohibitions or if it is limited to those cases discussed in the Gemara. The specific case he discusses is the prohibition against erasing the name of Hashem. If someone erased the "yud" at the end of Hashem's name and then a second person went ahead and erased another letter, has the second person violated a prohibition? He maintains that the second person has not violated a prohibition since he did not erase the name of Hashem. Once the first person erased the "yud" the letters that remain do not constitute the name of Hashem. The reason the second person who castrates an animal violates a prohibition is that the Torah goes out of its way to teach that even the second person violates the prohibition, but there is no such exposition to teach that someone who erases an erased name of Hashem has violated a prohibition. He then cites Shiltei Giborim² who also maintains that the second person who erased has not violated a prohibition and he offers the following explanation. From Rashi³ it is evident that the second violator is liable only if he contributed to the prohibition, e.g. in the case of the mincha the first person kneaded the chometz and the second person baked it.

(Insight...continued from page 1)

the Beis HaMikdash is not functioning, a consecrated animal has no sacred value, and the prohibition to injure it is suspended. Nevertheless, the animal should not be cut up, as this would appear as if one is causing injury to a sacred animal.

In his Gilyon to the Gemara in Avoda Zara, Rabbi Akiva Eiger notes that the case where R' Meir prohibits causing a wound to a consecrated animal is one of a bechor, a first born male. Once a bechor has a blemish it no longer retains its kedushah, not bodily and not for its monetary value. It does not have to be redeemed. This is now comparable to the case in our Gemara, where placing a wound is not prohibited. The Yere'im answers that it is still prohibited rabbinically, in order that blemishes not be placed in other blemished sacred animals. ■

Once part of the name of Hashem is erased the second person does not contribute to the erasure of Hashem's name since the name was already erased.

Bnei Yonah⁴ disagrees and maintains that even after a letter of Hashem's name was erased it is prohibited to erase one of the remaining letters. He bases this on the fact that the prohibition against erasing Hashem's name is related to the mitzvah of destroying idolatry. Just like there is a mitzvah to uproot idolatry altogether, so too, the prohibition against erasing Hashem's name is in force as long as any part of the name still remains. ■

1. מנחת חינוך מצוה תל"ז אות ז.
2. שלטי גבורים שבועות ט"ז :
3. רש"י ד"ה הכל ודי"ה במסרס.
4. בני יונה הארוך יו"ד סי' רע"ו סוף סעי' י. ■

STORIES Off the Daf

Means to the Same End

"מנין שלא יגרם לו ע"י אחרים..."

A certain man became grey at a very young age and felt embarrassed because of this. People treated him as a much older man and nothing he could do would remove the stigma of being treated like he was twenty years older. He wished to dye his hair but did not wish to do so unless a halachically permitted way was found. Generally, dying hair is a violation of 'לא לבש', the prohibition against wearing women's clothes or the like.

But then he heard that there was a

medicine which could be taken orally which would dye his hair back to its original color. If this was halachically acceptable, he would be happy to try the treatment.

When this question reached the Chelkas Yaakov, zt"l, he ruled that it was obviously forbidden. "Even regarding Shabbos where we find that although melachah is forbidden, geramah is permitted, the Shulchan Aruch only permits this if not using the leniency will result in a great loss.¹ And who is to say that in this case we are as lenient as regarding Shabbos? Perhaps it is like doing an action which will cause a blemish in a firstborn animal which is forbidden, as we find in Menachos 56.

"It is important to recall that according to the Rambam, dying even one hair violates this law. And even the Ravad who argues about one hair may well agree that geramah is forbidden..."²

When Rav Moshe Feinstein was asked this same question, he also prohibited the use of an internal medication. He reasoned that there is no significant difference how the change in color is brought about—any means that results in dyeing is considered a particularly feminine practice, not to be engaged in by men.³ ■

1. גמי שבת דף ק"ד, ש"ע או"ח, סי' של"ד, סי' כ"ב
2. שו"ת חלקת יעקב, יו"ד, סי' פ"ז
3. אג"מ, י"ד ח"א, סי' פ"ג ■