

## OVERVIEW of the Daf

### 1) Preoccupied (cont.)

Shmuel's defense of his position regarding liability for transgressing a prohibition while preoccupied is unsuccessfully challenged.

Rava suggests another defense on behalf of Shmuel and cites a Baraisa in support of his resolution.

A point in the Baraisa is clarified.

A Baraisa presents a dispute about the extent of liability for shoveling coals on Shabbos.

R' Elazar and R' Chanina clarify the case of the Baraisa.

R' Yochanan concurs with this explanation.

Ami bar Avin and R' Chananya bar Avin suggest another explanation of the Baraisa.

Rava and R' Ashi offer their own explanations of the Baraisa.

Two related conflicting Baraisos are cited and the Gemara explains the rationale behind each Baraisa.

### הדרן עלך ספק אכל חלב

2) **MISHNAH:** The Mishnah discusses the parameters of the prohibition of consuming blood.

### 3) Types of blood

A Baraisa elaborates on the type of blood prohibited for consumption. ■

## REVIEW and Remember

1. What is the point of dispute between R' Shimon and R' Shimon ben Shezuri versus R' Yehudah?

2. What prohibitions does one violate if he shovels coals on Shabbos?

3. What is a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה?

4. What is דם תמצית?

## Distinctive INSIGHT

### Variations of מתעסק

בנשימה אחת חייב

Rava explains the disagreement between R" Yehuda and R' Shimon. R' Shimon holds that R' Eliezer and R' Yehoshua disagree where a person intended on Shabbos to cut two different detached fruits, and he clearly meant to cut one of them first which turned out to be attached, and not detached as he had thought, but he accidentally cut the other one first. R' Eliezer would say he must bring a chattas, while R' Yehoshua says he is exempt. However, if the person intended to cut two of the same fruit, even though he aimed to cut one of them first and he inadvertently cut the other one first, all would agree that he brings a chattas. R' Yehuda says that R' Eliezer and R' Yehoshua disagree even in this second case of two of the same type of fruit.

The explanation of Rava indicates that R' Eliezer and R' Yehoshua only disagree regarding an error regarding which fruit was meant to be cut and which was actually cut, but all would agree that if a person meant to cut one plant and totally missed and cut a different one instead that he would be exempt due to the law of מתעסק, even if they were both the same type of fruit. This is precisely the contention of Shmuel.

The Gemara brings a proof that an act can be considered מתעסק even when the intent is to perform two acts in a certain order and the order is inadvertently reversed. A Baraisa teaches that if someone aimed to extinguish one candle, but extinguished another by mistake, he is exempt. If he meant to light one and then extinguish the other, and he accidentally extinguished the second one first, and then lit the first one, if he did so in one breath, he is liable. However, if it was done in the reverse order in two breaths he is exempt, based upon the principle of מתעסק. We see that Rava's contention is that mere reversal of order of intended sequence of events is considered מתעסק.

Aruch LaNer points out that the reference to "two breaths" has to be explained. If the first candle was extinguished in the first breath, how was the second candle lit in the second breath? If the first act was to light a candle, this could be done with the flame that is present, and a second breath could then extinguish the other candle. But if the first event is extinguishing, no flame remains to light the other candle. Aruch LaNer notes that Rashi seems to have this text, but other sources do not.

Rambam explains (Hilchos Shabbos 1:11) that if one wished to light one candle and extinguish another, and the

## HALACHAH Highlight

### The consumption of human flesh

אוציא דם מהלכי שתיים וכו'

*I will exclude the blood of those who walk on two legs etc.*

The Gemara infers from a pasuk that it is only the blood of lower animals and birds that is prohibited but the blood of people is Biblically permitted. Interestingly, the Gemara never discusses whether the flesh of people is prohibited and as a result the issue is subject to debate. Rambam<sup>1</sup> writes that one who consumes human flesh does not violate a Biblical prohibition and as a result does not receive lashes for the transgression. However, he has violated a positive command. The Torah enumerates seven different animals that one may eat and the wording indicates that one may eat the flesh of only these seven animals to the exclusion of anything else including human flesh. Ramban<sup>2</sup> suggests that Rambam based his position on the Sifrei that teaches that one who eats human flesh has not violated a Torah prohibition. This implies that such a person has not violated a Torah prohibition but has violated a positive command. Magid Mishnah<sup>3</sup> adds that even according to Rambam who prohibits the consumption of human flesh, blood and cheilev are Biblically permitted. The rule that anything that comes from something that is not kosher is not kosher is limited to those things that are prohibited by a negative command but the principle does not apply to things that are

*(Insight...continued from page 1)*  
situation reversed and he first extinguished the second candle and later lit the first candle, he is exempt. Rambam does not mention the detail of this being done in “two breaths.” Sefer Kesser Yeshua explains that when the first candle was extinguished the flame ignited a nearby wick which glowed until the second breath caused it to ignite the second candle. ■

prohibited by a positive command.

Ramban<sup>2</sup> disagrees with Rambam's position and asserts that since the blood of a person is Biblically permitted it must be that his flesh is Biblically permitted as well. The principle that what comes from something that is not kosher is not kosher would indicate that if human flesh was prohibited human blood would also be prohibited. If human blood is permitted it must be that human flesh is also permitted. Ran<sup>4</sup> adds that human flesh will also not be subject to the prohibition of flesh from a living creature – אבר מן החי – since that prohibition is limited to creatures that must be slaughtered before consumption. Since human flesh is permitted without slaughter it must be that it is not included in the prohibition of אבר מן החי. Rashba<sup>5</sup> contends that although Biblically permitted human flesh is Rabbinically prohibited for consumption. ■

1. רמב"ם פ"ב מהל' מאכלות אסורות ה"ג.
2. רמב"ן כתובות ס. ד"ה אוציא.
3. מגיד משנה על הרמב"ם הנ"ל.
4. ר"ן על הר"ף כתובות שם.
5. שו"ת הרשב"א ח"א סי' שס"ד. ■

## STORIES Off the Daf

### The Golden Treasure

החותה גחלים בשבת

Today's daf continues discussing the halachos of Shabbos.

It is hard to describe the dire poverty that afflicted the citizens of Yerushalayim eighty years ago. The scarcity of food was so extreme that children sometimes went to sleep without having tasted a morsel the entire day.

One child was walking along on a Shabbos afternoon when he noticed a very valuable gold coin. Of course he could not pick it up, since it was muktzeh. But he figured that he could stand on it, to guard it and take it after Shabbos. Unfortunately, an Arab youth

passed by and noticed that the boy remained stationary. Understanding that it was Shabbos and that the boy might be guarding something to take after Shabbos, he threw the child to the floor and spotted the valuable coin—which he immediately pocketed.

The child was overwhelmed with grief. Not only had he endured being thrown violently to the ground, he had also lost a coin which could have fed his family for quite some time. He went into the Rachmastrivka shul and began to cry bitter tears.

When Rav Menachem Nochum, zt"l, the Rachmastrivka Rebbe, heard a child crying copiously in the beis haknesses, he immediately went to see what had occurred. When he asked the child and was told the entire story, he comforted the child. “Today is Shabbos, so we can't

speak about money, but please calm down for now. Come to see me after Shabbos.”

After Shabbos the rebbe took out a coin—exactly like what had been taken from him—and showed it to the child. “I am happy to give you this coin if you will sell me the merit of having endured great pain for the honor of Shabbos. To keep the halachah you were thrown onto the floor and you lost a fortune of money.”

But the boy immediately refused. “No. I will not relinquish the reward for this mitzvah for any money in the world!”

Later the boy recounted. “I left the rebbe's presence with a conviction that the treasure I had gained through my suffering was much more valuable than any mere coin!”<sup>1</sup> ■

1. עלון "קהל חסידי באיאן", גליון קי"ח