

## OVERVIEW of the Daf

### 1) בל תאחר (cont.)

The Gemara continues to challenge the necessity of the last statement of the Baraisa, i.e. that a Korban does not become invalid if it is brought late.

The Gemara concludes that the teaching is unnecessary and the pasuk is used to teach that a man's wife will not die if he violates בל תאחר.

A Baraisa is cited that teaches about the obligation to pay one's vows in a timely fashion.

The necessity of three of the drashos mentioned in the Baraisa is challenged.

The reason two sets of drashos are necessary to teach these halachos is explained, i.e. one drosha refers to a case where the person made a declaration but did not designate an animal, and the second drosha is necessary for a case where he designated the animal but did not make a declaration.

This explanation is unsuccessfully challenged.

Rava rules that one violates the prohibition against delaying a charity vow immediately.

The reason one may have thought differently is explained.

Rava teaches that one is in violation of a positive commandment if a festival passes without having fulfilled his obligation to bring voluntary offerings.

This ruling is unsuccessfully challenged.

Rava teaches that once the three festivals have passed his is liable for his violation each and every day.

This ruling is unsuccessfully challenged.

An earlier cited Baraisa stated that whether a year passed without the three festivals or if the three festivals pass without a year the person is in violation of בל תאחר.

The Gemara questions how it is possible for a year to pass without the three festivals passing as well.

The Gemara cites an opinion which maintains that the calendar could be adjusted so that Shavuos will fall on the seventh of Sivan. Accordingly, it is possible for a year to pass (6th of Sivan to the 6th of Sivan) without the three festivals transpiring.

R' Zeira questioned whether an heir can be liable for בל תאחר.

The Gemara answers that he is not liable.

R' Zeira asks whether a woman could violate this prohibition since she has no obligation to appear in the Beis HaMikdash during the festivals.

Abaye seemingly resolves this inquiry.

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 הרב נתנאל בן ר' עזריאל הכהן, ע"ה

## Distinctive INSIGHT

*The authority of Beis Din to enforce a person's compliance with his commitments*

דַּתְנִינָא : יִקְרִיב אוֹתוֹ — מִלְמַד שְׂכּוּפִין אוֹתוֹ...עַד שִׁיאִמַר רוֹצֵה אֲנִי

The Gemara cited a Baraisa in which the word ועשית was expounded to teach that the Beis Din is empowered to force a person to carry through and honor his verbal commitment to bring an offering. The Gemara challenged this insight by showing that this same lesson is apparently learned from a different verse altogether. יקריב teaches that a person can be compelled to fulfill his responsibilities. The Gemara resolves this problem by demonstrating that the two verses actually teach two distinct cases of Beis Din intervening to compel a person to fulfill his pledge. והבאתם refers to a case of a person who made his pledge, but did not yet designate an animal to be offered. יקריב teaches that Beis Din should pressure a person who designated the animal he intends to bring, but he did not yet offer it.

Sfas Emes notes that the verse of יקריב would not necessarily teach that Beis Din has the authority to enforce the person's timely fulfillment of his promise. Perhaps Beis Din can only intervene once the time has expired and the person is in violation of בל תאחר. The verse in which we find the word ועשית speaks about תשמור—guarding, from which we learn that a person might become guilty of בל תאחר. This verse alone teaches that Beis Din has the authority to intervene and impose pressure to prevent a person from delaying his offering before arriving at בל תאחר. Where, then, does the Gemara see a redundancy in these two verses in the first place?

Sfas Emes answers that the Gemara is bothered by the fact that the only verse necessary is actually the one of ועשית from which we see that Beis Din can enforce bringing of an offering before בל תאחר takes effect. We would know that this authority extends to where a person has been even more neglectful and is in violation of בל תאחר. ■

## REVIEW and Remember

1. Why are two sources needed to teach about the obligation to fulfill one's vow to offer a Korban?
2. Is one permitted to delay fulfilling a pledge to tzedakah?
3. How is it possible for Shavuos to fall on the seventh of Sivan?
4. Is a husband obligated to provide his wife with simchah on Yom Tov?

# HALACHAH Highlight

## Vows of charity

בפיך זו צדקה אמר רבא וצדקה מיחייב עלה לאלתר מאי טעמא דהא קיימי עניים

“With your mouth,” refers to tzedaka. Rava said: Regarding tzedakah one is liable [for delaying the fulfillment of a vow] immediately. What is the reason? Because poor people are present [who need the money.]

Based on this Gemara, Rambam<sup>1</sup> writes: A tzedakah pledge is a form of a vow, therefore if one vows to give a selah to tzedakah or if he commits to give a particular coin to tzedakah he is obligated to give the pledged money to the poor immediately. If he delays giving the money he violates the prohibition of **בל תאחר** since he has the ability to give the money and poor people are present. If, however, poor people are not present one should set aside the money until a poor person is available. This ruling is cited by Shulchan Aruch<sup>2</sup>. Rav Betzalel Stern<sup>3</sup> questions whether one violates **בל תאחר** every day he does not fulfill his pledge or whether he violates the prohibition only once and the violation is ongoing. His conclu-

sion is that once a poor person comes to collect the money and the donor does not fulfill his vow, he violates the prohibition and that violation continues until he fulfills his vow. There is a dispute whether the new refusal constitutes a new violation or a continuation of the original violation if, after refusing to give tzedakah to the first poor person, he subsequently refuses to fulfill his vow when a second and third poor person asks for the money.

Rav Moshe Isserles<sup>4</sup>, the Rema, qualifies this ruling and states that it applies only when the donor is going to distribute the money to the poor himself. If, however, the pledge was made to a shul or other charitable organization, one does not violate **בל תאחר**, even if poor people are present, until the gabbai tzedakah claims the money. Only when the gabbai tzedakah claims the money and the donor refuses to fulfill his vow is the prohibition violated. Furthermore, if the gabbai tzedakah is unaware of the pledge the donor is obligated to inform him that a pledge was made so that he will be able to claim the money. ■

1. רמב"ם פ"ח מהל' מתנות עניים ה"א

2. שו"ע יו"ד סי' רנ"ז סע' ג' נע' בבאר הגולה אות ט' שצ"ן לרמב"ם ריש פ"ז ונמצא ריש פ"ח

3. שו"ת בצל החכמה ח"ד סי' ע'

4. רמ"א שם ■

# STORIES Off the Daf

## Standing Before Hashem

כופין אותו עד שיאמר רוצה אני

On today's daf, we find in the Baraisa that on the one hand, the phrase **יקריב אותו** teaches us to force the person who committed to bring a sacrifice to actually do it. Nevertheless, the phrase, **לרצונו** means that he must still bring it willingly. The way these two conflicting concepts are reconciled is through the dictum: “We force him until he is willing to bring it.”

The Beis Yisroel of Ger, ז"ל, was a very deep thinker, possessed of unusually penetrating insight into people. His followers knew that what he said often hid another level of meaning. Once, a certain chossid spent Shabbos with the Gerrer Rebbe, and when Motzei Shabbos came, he approached the Beis Yisroel person-

ally. As the man was taking leave of his Rebbe, the Beis Yisroel asked pointedly, “So, where did you eat for Shabbos?”

The chossid understood that the Rebbe had meant to hint at something deeper than merely where he had eaten the meals. Just as one must feed the physical body, one must also feed the soul by learning on Shabbos.

The Rebbe explained what he had meant. “The Gemara in Rosh HaShanah 6a explains that, when it comes to bringing an offering that a person has already committed to bring, we force him until he is willing to fulfill his obligation. There are many sources that explain how we literally force him into the Azarah, until he is standing ‘before Hashem.’ At that point, the person immediately becomes willing to bring the offering of his own accord. Merely being ‘before Hashem’ causes one to lose his prior reservations and fulfill his commitment willingly. Like the Azarah of the Beis HaMikdash, Shabbos is also ever ‘before

Hashem.’ As we say in Magen Avos, ‘We will serve before Him in awe and fear.’ During the week, everyone is busy making a living, but on Shabbos our true inner self comes out. How can we do anything but use this precious opportunity for learning and introspection!” ■

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## 2) Bechor

The Gemara questions when to begin calculating the year of a bechor for the halacha that requires that the bechor should be eaten within a year.

Abaye maintains the year is calculated from birth, whereas R' Acha bar Yaakov maintains it is calculated from when the bechor is eight days old.

The Gemara notes that the two opinions do not disagree. R' Acha bar Yaakov referred to an unblemished bechor whereas Abaye referred to a blemished bechor. ■