

OVERVIEW of the Daf

1) The folds of one's body (cont.)

Reish Lakish discusses one who moves someone with a rod in the folds of his body, and differentiates between a tamei person moving a tahor person and a tahor person moving a tamei person.

The rationale behind these rulings is recorded.

2) Clarifying the Mishnah

The sources that a zav and ba'al kerai are not tamei'im until the discharge leaves their body are presented.

The ruling that the kohen grabs himself so that he could swallow the terumah in his mouth is challenged.

Abaye and Rava offer different explanations.

The basis for the disagreement is clarified.

Rava's position is unsuccessfully challenged.

3) Hargashah

Shmuel rules that a discharge of zera that is not accompanied by a hargashah does not transmit tum'ah.

This ruling is unsuccessfully challenged.

A second version of Shmuel's teaching is recorded.

The difference between the two versions is explained.

It is noted that although the matter was obvious to Shmuel, Rava inquired whether zera that was dislodged with a hargashah but exited the body without a hargashah renders one tamei.

The Gemara unsuccessfully attempts to resolve this inquiry.

A third version of Shmuel's statement is recorded.

Rava asks a related question regarding a gentile whose zera was dislodged and then exited his body after conversion.

After explaining the question the matter is left unresolved.

Two more unresolved inquiries of Rava are presented.

4) Zav

Shmuel gives the measurement for the minimum amount of zivah to render a man tamei.

This ruling is challenged and resolved by asserting that Shmuel follows the position of R' Nosson in the name of R' Yishmael.

The exchange between R' Yishmael and Rabanan concerning R' Yishmael's source for his position is recorded.

5) Zera

R' Chanilei in the name of R' Elazar the son of R' Shimon discusses the amount of zera needed to qualify as an emission and the quantity necessary to render one who touches it tamei.

Two unsuccessful challenges to this ruling are presented.

Following the second challenge R' Pappa suggests that the matter is subject to a debate between Amoraim.

R' Huna the son of R' Nosson rejects this assertion in favor of another explanation of the debate.

It turns out that some scholars taught the debate as did R' Pappa while others taught the debate as understood by R' Huna the son of R' Nosson.

6) **MISHNAH:** The Mishnah enumerates different halachos that apply to newborns. ■

Distinctive INSIGHT

Halachos which apply to newborns

תינוקת בת יום אחד מטמאה בנדה וכו' תינוק בן יום אחד... ומטמא בנגעים ומטמא בטמא מת וכו'

The Mishnah lists a series of halachos which apply even to a newborn. The Gemara explains the source for each one, and the commentaries point out the novelty behind each discussion.

One of the halachos is that the laws of niddah apply even to blood which issues from a newborn baby girl. The Gemara presents the source for this rule from an extra letter "ו" found at the beginning of the posuk in Vayikra 15:19. Sefer Sidrei Taharah (Y.D. 190:#1) asks that we hold that the Torah does not consider a woman as a niddah, even when blood is issued from her body, unless it is accompanied by a sensation. If she does not feel the opening of the uterus, the blood is not tamei. Therefore, how can we say that a newborn baby girl is sensitive to this sensation and is therefore a niddah? He explains that this is apparently a proof for the opinion of Rambam (Hilchos Isurei Bi'ah 9:1) who says that we can rely upon the assumption that blood flows accompanied with a sensation, and that we rely upon the statistical majority that most women do experience this.

The Mishnah also teaches that that laws of nega'im (spots of tzara'as) and the laws of tum'ah from a corpse apply to newborn infants. Aruch LaNer notes that the halachos in the Mishnah from this point and on apply equally to newborn boys and girls. Nevertheless, the Mishnah illustrates these halachos in terms of a newborn boy (תינוק), rather than expressing them in a generic plural sense ("they are tamei'eim...") because of the law of yibbum. If the infant's brother dies childless, the widow must wait and have either chalitzah or yibbum done by the infant, her husband's surviving brother. Similarly, the law of inheritance is only applicable to an infant boy, because girls do not generally inherit. These halachos can only be taught in reference to an infant boy, so the Mishnah uses a consistent style and uses an infant boy as the subject for all cases.

Tosafos notes that the posuk which introduces the laws of nega'im (Vayikra 13) and that which teaches the laws of tum'ah of a corpse (Bemidbar 19) each describes that these conditions apply "to a man or woman." This might indicate that an infant would be excluded. This is why the Mishnah had to teach that these halachos also apply to infants, based upon lessons from various pesukim.

Aruch LaNer cites the Gemara in Arachin (3a) which says that the reason we might have excluded an infant from the laws of nega'im is based upon the posuk (BeMidbar 19:20) "a man that is tamei," but an infant is ultimately included because a different posuk (ibid. v.18) uses the term "נפשות—the souls," rather than "איש," which includes even infants. ■

Today's Daf Digest is dedicated
לעילוי נשמת הרב אביגדור בן הרב שאול אלחנן ע"ה
Rabbi Victor Amster o.b.m.

By his children Mr. and Mrs. Jeremy Amster

HALACHA Highlight

A pregnant wife of a kohen entering a room that contains a corpse

ומטמא בטמא מת

And he can become tamei from corpse tumah

Shach¹ in the name of Rokeach writes that the wife of a kohen who is pregnant may enter a room that contains a corpse without concern that the fetus she is carrying is male and she would thereby cause the fetus to become tamei. The reason this is permitted is that there is a double doubt (sfek sfeikah) that indicates that it is permitted. Perhaps the fetus is not viable, and even if it is viable perhaps it is female which may be in the same room as a corpse. Pischei Teshuvah² cites many later authorities who wonder why Rokeach had to resort to using a sfek sfeikah when there is a simpler reason why it is permitted for the pregnant wife of a kohen to enter a room with a corpse. The fetus is “swallowed,” and tahor items that are swallowed do not become tamei. Chelkas Yoav³ also challenges Rokeach’s rationale and his challenge is based on our Gemara. Our Gemara derives from the phrase ועל הנפשות that it is prohibited even for a newborn kohen to become tamei. This implies that the prohibition begins only after birth, but while the fetus is still inside of its mother’s womb there is no restriction.

Shevet HaLevi⁴ elaborates on this topic and also cites our Gemara as a challenge to Rokeach. He then writes that

REVIEW and Remember

1. What is the point of dispute between Abaye and Rava ?

2. What issue was obvious to Shmuel but unclear to Rava ?

3. What is the point of dispute between Rabbanan and R' Yishmael ?

4. What is the youngest that a girl can become a zavah ?

he agrees with Nesiv Chaim’s explanation of Rokeach. Nesiv Chaim asserts that Rokeach was referring to a woman who is about to deliver her fetus and the concern is that she may deliver in the room that contains the corpse. Since there is a chance the baby may come out perhaps it should be prohibited for the mother to even enter the room with the corpse. Addressing that point Rokeach writes that there is a sfek skeikah permitting it. In his conclusion Shevet HaLevi writes that there is no reason for a wife of a kohen who is pregnant to hesitate entering a hospital being that there are numerous reasons to permit the practice. ■

¹ ש"ך יו"ד סי' שע"א סק"א.
² פתחי שתובה שם סק"א.
³ חלקת יואב בקונטרס קבא דקשיייתא קושיא מ"ג.
⁴ שו"ת שבט הלוי ח"ב סי' ר"ה. ■

STORIES off the Daf

"In His Dream..."

”בחלומו...”

Today's daf discusses a case where one had a vivid dream.

Our sages say that usually one dreams about what he thinks about during the day. Rav Ovadiah Yosef, shlit"א, uses this maxim to explain why the brothers suspected Yosef of plans to subjugate them. They figured that he was fantasizing about ruling over them. But the truth was that Yosef had no such designs. His dreams were not a

product of what he was thinking about during his waking hours. They were a revelation of what the future would bring.¹

Reishis Chochmah, zt"l, writes a general rule for when dreams are true and when they are not. “Dreams come from on high. But one who is not completely truthful throughout the day can also have dreams which are false. One who is always truthful and acts as if fitting will always be shown the truth in his dreams. As we find in the Zohar in Parshas Mikeitz, the dreams of one who is truly righteous will be true.”²

Another interesting aspect of dreams is the rule that they come true as inter-

preted. The Zohar uses this concept to explain why the brothers were so upset by Yosef's dreams. “When the brothers heard the dreams they immediately blurted out, ‘Will you then rule over us...’ These words were actually their interpretation of the dreams! This came to pass precisely because of this interpretation. When the brothers realized what they had done, they began to hate Yosef even more because of his dreams.”³ ■

¹ הליכות מוסר, ח"א
² ראשית חכמה, שער הקדושה, פ"ב
³ זוהר בפרשת מקץ ■

