

## OVERVIEW of the Daf

### 1) Human blood (cont.)

The Gemara answers the challenge to the ruling of R' Sheishes that there is not even a mitzvah to refrain from consuming human blood.

A second context of R' Sheishes's response is presented.

### 2) Heart

A Mishnah rules that if one did not tear open the heart but merely salted or roasted it he has not transgressed anything.

R' Zeira in the name of Rav asserts that this ruling is limited to the heart of a bird.

This qualification is unsuccessfully challenged.

### 3) Bloodletting blood

R' Yochanan and Reish Lakish debate what is the blood of bloodletting "upon which the soul is dependent."

Reish Lakish's opinion is that it is the last black drop and onward is the blood upon which the soul is dependent. This view is unsuccessfully challenged.

D'vei R' Yishmael teaches that spurting blood does render foods susceptible to tum'ah.

R' Yirmiyah inquires about the extent of liability for one who let blood from an animal and received the blood in two cups and then consumed that blood.

R' Zeira answered that the matter is subject to debate between R' Yochanan and Reish Lakish.

### 4) R' Yehudah's position

R' Elazar asserts that R' Yehudah would agree that draining blood does not effect atonement if placed on the Altar.

R' Nachman bar Yitzchok cites a Beraisa that supports this teaching.

5) **MISHNAH:** The Mishnah records a discussion regarding the liability for offering an asham talui.

### 6) Clarifying the dispute between R' Akiva and Chachamim

A Beraisa elaborates on the dispute between R' Akiva and Chachamim.

An explanation of the point of dispute is suggested.

R' Pappa rejects this explanation in favor of another explanation of the dispute.

This explanation is rejected and another explanation is proposed.

An unsuccessful challenge to this explanation is presented.

The exchange between R' Akiva and Chachamim about this point is recorded.

Rava clarifies two points regarding the Beraisa.

7) **MISHNAH:** The Mishnah begins with a discussion of a woman who was bringing a korban out of doubt and realized that she was indeed obligated to offer a chattas. The Mishnah then discusses eating transgressions and which korban, if any, is brought. ■

## Distinctive INSIGHT

### *The blood of an animal collected in two cups*

הקזו דם לבהמה וקיבל דמה בשני כוסות מהו

When an animal is shechted, the first blood which flows out is blackish, followed by blood which is red. Both of these spurt and do not flow. The blood then begins to flow strongly, after which the blood flows smoothly.

The posuk in Vayikra (14:17) teaches that the Torah prohibits its consumption of blood, but it specifies that this only includes "blood of the soul," which is that which flows as the life of the animal ends. The Mishnah (20b) taught that blood of a mammal which flows as an animal dies is prohibited to be eaten, and violating this sin carries the punishment of kareis. Regarding the precise definition of "the blood of the soul" we find a disagreement between R' Yochanan and Reish Lakish. R' Yochanan says that it includes all blood as long as it is flowing, which includes all blood until the final stage of the smooth blood flow described above. Reish Lakish contends that the "blood of the soul" only includes the blood after the final drop of a blackish color has ended, which is only after the first stage described above.

R' Yirmiya asked R' Zeira what the halacha would be in a case where someone drew blood from an animal until it died, as he collected the blood in two cups, and he then drank the blood. Rashi explains that the first container had in it "soul-blood," and the second had blood from after the final smooth flow. R' Zeira pointed out that the answer to his question was dependent upon the disagreement between the Amoraim. Reish Lakish says the person must bring two chattaos. R' Yochanan says that he is liable only for drinking blood of the first cup, but he is exempt for drinking the second cup which did not contain "soul-blood."

Tosafos adds that the case which R' Yirmiya asked about must be where the person drank from the two cups in two stages of unawareness, for if he drank them successively, he would only be liable for one chattas, as this would be considered one extended violation. Rather, he drank the first cup by itself, and he became aware of his error. He then drank the second cup, and the question is whether he is liable for the second cup.

Rambam (Hilchos Shegagos 6:3) understands the question of the Gemara a bit differently, and he rules that if one drinks both cups in one stage of unawareness he must bring only one chattas. This implies that if he drinks them in two stages of unawareness he would bring two chattaos. Mahar"i Kurkos (Ma'achalos Asuros 6:3) notes that Rambam rules according to R' Yochanan, and there should be no liability for the second cup, which contains no "blood of the soul." Mahar"i Kurkos explains that Rambam holds that both cups had soul-blood, and the question of R' Yirmiya was if drinking two cups in one stage of unawareness is considered only one episode of sin (R' Yochanan) or if it is two episodes of sin (Reish Lakish). ■

# HALACHA Highlight

*Mar'is ayin on Rabbinic prohibitions*

דם שעל גבי ככר וכוי

*Blood that is on a loaf etc.*

The Gemara teaches that if one discovers blood from one's teeth on bread he must scrape away the blood before eating the bread. The blood that remains in one's mouth is permitted. The reason for the prohibition is **מראית עין** – the appearance of impropriety. In other words, it looks as though one is consuming blood of an animal. Rema<sup>1</sup> asserts that the principle of **מראית עין** is limited to prohibitions that are Biblical in origin. There is no concern for **מראית עין** for those things that are Rabbinically prohibited. Therefore, he permits putting fowl into almond milk. Since fowl and milk are only Rabbinically prohibited there is no **מראית עין** concern. In contrast if one wants to put animal meat into almond milk he must have almonds nearby to offset the potential **מראית עין** concern.

Yam Shel Shlomo<sup>2</sup> disagrees and writes that when following the custom of eating chicken in almond milk on Purim one has to be mindful of the **מראית עין** issue and should make sure that there are almonds in the milk or nearby. He explains that there is a greater concern for **מראית עין** since one could mistakenly conclude that there is not even a Rabbinic prohibition against eating chicken and milk in accordance with the position of R' Yosi HaGalili. Shach<sup>3</sup> writes that Yam Shel Shlomo's position is the one adopted by later authorities who

# REVIEW and Remember

1. How does one properly remove the blood from a heart ?

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2. What is the point of dispute between R' Akiva and Chachamim ?

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3. Is there such a thing as a partial hekeish ?

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4. Can a bird be transformed from a doubtful chattas to a definite chattas after melikah ?

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agree that **מראית עין** applies even to Rabbinic prohibitions.

Pri Chadash<sup>4</sup> disagrees with Shach and subscribes to Rema's lenient position. He explains that even according to Rashba who prohibits meat with a woman's milk due to **מראית עין** we cannot extend his ruling to anything beyond what he wrote since we are not empowered to create new **מראית עין** concerns. Even with regards to Biblical prohibitions we may not create a new **מראית עין** concern. Once Rashba prohibited meat and a woman's milk we accept his ruling, but with regard to other Rabbinic prohibitions we do not generate new **מראית עין** concerns. ■

<sup>1</sup> תורת חטאת כלל ס"ב דין ח' ויו"ד סי' פ"ז סעי' ג'.  
<sup>2</sup> ים של שלמה חולין פ"ח סי' נ"ב.  
<sup>3</sup> שו"ת שם סק"ו.  
<sup>4</sup> פרי חדש שם סק"ז. ■

# STORIES off the Daf

*A Questionable Action*

"לאשם בכסף שקלים..."

It is certainly intriguing that purchasing an asham talui—brought to atone for the possibility that one sinned—costs more than a korban chattas, brought to atone for a definite transgression. The Ramah learns an important lesson regarding teshuvah from this halacha. "One who is unsure whether he has sinned is in a more precarious position regarding doing teshuva than one who has certainly sinned. One is certain that he has sinned is sure to regret his sin

and truly repent eventually; but one who is unsure whether he sinned may not repent. This is why an asham talui costs more than a korban chattas. One who is unsure whether he has sinned must work harder to repent for acting in a manner that might have been sinful, than for an outright transgression of the same sin."<sup>1</sup>

This concept is also found in Avos D'Rabi Nosson: "Rabi Meir said that the the Torah views one who may have sinned as if he has definitely transgressed. We see this since one who definitely sinned, pays a selah and a pundiyon. But one who is unsure whether he has sinned must bring an asham talui which costs two selah. Obviously one

who may have sinned is regarded at least as serious as a possible sin."<sup>2</sup>

The Beis Avraham of Slonim, zt"l, expands upon this concept. "The way of Amalek is to plunge a person into doubt. Amalek cools a person off from caring whether he may have fallen. When one is unsure whether he is acting in a proper manner or not, Amalek will always push him to act inappropriately. This is why the word **עמלק** has a numerical value of two hundred and forty, the same numerical value as **ספק**, which means doubt."<sup>3</sup> ■

<sup>1</sup> רמ"א או"ח, סי' תר"ג, סעי' א'  
<sup>2</sup> אבות דרבי נתן, פרק ל'  
<sup>3</sup> בית אברהם ■

